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PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN THE COMPETING REFORM DRAFTS OF THE 
FRENCH CIVIL CODE
1. Introduction
‘Obviously disproportionate’ was the description given by the Cour de cassation about a 
1,460,000 USD punitive award ordered by the Supreme Court of California (County of 
Alameda), in addition to 1.8 million USD compensatory damages, against a French 
manufacturer for non-performance of a 826,000 USD deal concluded with American 
purchasers.1 Th e Cour de cassation confi rmed the exequatur refusal of the Californian 
decision on the ground that:
‘if a condemnation to pay punitive damages is, as such, not contrary to public order, it is 
otherwise when the amount of damages is obviously disproportionate compared to the harm 
suff ered and the contractual breach’ (transl. CM).
Th e reasoning of the French Supreme Court echoes the cautious admission of punitive 
damages by three recent competing reform draft s of the Code civil.2 Th ese draft s all 
contain a punitive damages provision revealing a consensus, among the draft ers, about 
the admissibility of this common law concept within French civil liability. French private 
* Assistant professor, Faculty of Law, Private Law Department, VU University Amsterdam. I would like 
to thank the editors and Frances Gilligan for their comments and suggestions on an earlier draft  of this 
paper. Th e usual disclaimer applies.
1 Cass. 1e civ., 1 décembre 2010, n° 09–13303, (Epoux X – Rejet pourvoi c/CA Poitiers, 26 février 2009), 
available at: www.legifrance.fr. About the enforcement of US punitive damages awards in Belgium, 
Germany and Italy, see Evelien de Kezel’s contribution in this book.
2 Th ese draft s are, chronologically presented:
 (1) Th e ‘Avant-projet de réforme du droit des obligations (Articles 1101 à 1386 du Code civil) et du droit 
de la prescription (Articles 2234 à 2281 du Code civil), Rapport à Monsieur Pascal Clément, Garde des 
Sceaux, Ministre de la Justice’, from September 2005, supervised by Prof. Catala and Viney and 
published at www.justice.gouv.fr/Art_pix/RAPPORTCATALASEPTEMBRE2005.pdf;
 (2) Th e ‘Proposition de loi n° 657 portant réforme de la responsabilité civile’ from July 2010 (www.senat.fr/
dossier-legislatif/ppl09–657.html), and;
 (3) Th e Draft  published in ‘Pour une réforme du droit de la responsabilité’, Paris: Dalloz 2011, under the 
supervision of Prof. Terré.
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law indeed, is not at odds with repressive mechanisms.3 Still, the design of these provisions 
betrays a reluctance towards the allowance of damages which are out of proportion with 
the losses caused.
Indeed, punitive damages fundamentally depart from the exclusively compensatory 
function of French civil liability summed up in its founding principle of ‘réparation 
intégrale’ or full reparation.4 According to this traditional reparation rule, damages 
aim at repairing ‘all, but no more than, the harm suff ered’: they must neither lead to 
profi t, nor to losses for the victim (‘ni perte, ni profi t pour la victime’) and are not linked 
to the gravity of the damaging behaviour.5 But sanctioning the seriousness of certain 
damaging behaviour is precisely what all three draft ing groups are aiming for when 
adopting a punitive damages provision. No consensus emerges from these draft s, 
however, as to the damaging behaviour(s) to be sanctioned and the features of the 
sanction itself (e.g. calculation basis, upper limit, benefi ciaries, insurability). Th is paper 
off ers a comparative analysis of the three competing punitive damages provisions, each 
establishing a diff erent balance between the call for a punitive mechanism as private 
enforcement tool and the continued loyalty towards the traditional compensatory 
function of civil liability. Aft er an overview of the respective fundamentals of the 
competing reform draft s (par. 2), follows a detailed comparison of their respective 
punitive damages provision (par. 3).
2. Th e Competing Reform Draft s – General Highlights
In July 2010, the First Legislative Chamber registered a new bill proposal – hereaft er the 
Béteille Proposal6 – the purpose of which is to reform and codify present tort law. Its 
punitive damages provision is to be found in Article 1386–25 Béteille Proposal.7 Th is 
3 See Borghetti 2009. Th is author describes a series of punitive mechanisms one encounters in French 
civil law, among which a contractual mechanism such as penalty clauses (clauses pénales) or a more 
general device like civil fi nes. Civil fi nes are defi ned as ‘provided for in a civil statute (…) and to which 
one can be sentenced by a civil court’ (Borghetti 2009, § 18) when the litigious conduct do also not 
constitute a criminal off ence. French law distinguishes civil fi nes from criminal fi nes and administrative 
fi nes (see Behar-Touchais 2002, § 8–14). Th ey are a serious competitor to punitive damages. However, 
contrary to punitive damages, their amount oft en remains low. Th ere is one major exception though: 
Article L. 442–6-III Commercial Code provides that those who infringes certain prohibited practices 
in business-to-business relations can be ordered to pay a fi ne up to € 2 million. He further discusses the 
‘widely shared belief ’ in the existence of a judicial practice of covert punitive damages award taking in 
order to take into account – in violation of the full reparation rule – of the seriousness of the defendant’s 
behaviour and/or the gain he or she thereby achieved, Borghetti 2009, § 22–29.
4 E.g. Cass. 2e civ., 23 janvier 2003, Bull. civ. II n° 20.
5 E.g. Fabre-Magnan 2004, n° 338, Le Tourneau & Cadiet 2007, n° 2523s. An exception to this principle 
exists, though, in case of fraudulent breach of contract (Article 1150 Code civil, faute dolosive) e.g. a 
deliberate non-performance of a contractual obligation combined with the promisor’s intention to 
harm. In that case, the promisor might be condemned to compensate foreseeable as well as unforeseeable 
damages suff ered by the promisee, see e.g. Fabre-Magnan 2004, § 217, Vignolle 2010, § II.A.
6 Th e proposal is named aft er the First Chamber member Laurent Béteille who initiated it. It has not been 
submitted to voting yet.
7 Article 1386–25 provides that:
 ‘In cases where the law expressly provides so, when the damage results from a deliberate wrongdoing or 
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proposal follows up an information report of the First Legislative Chamber Law 
Commission on the reform of French civil liability – hereaft er Béteille & Anziani 
report.8 Th e Béteille Proposal ‘translate[s], into legislative form’ the recommendations of 
that prior report.9 Th e Béteille & Anziani report and Béteille Proposal both follow in the 
footsteps of the Avant-Projet de réforme du droit des obligations published in 2005 under 
the leadership of Professor Catala – hereaft er Catala Draft  – which contains a punitive 
damages provision at Article 1371 Catala Draft .10 In 2010, a third reform draft  was 
offi  cially submitted by the so-called Terré draft ing group to the Minister of Justice and 
published in March 2011 – hereaft er the Terré Tort Draft . Punitive damages are codifi ed 
in Article 69 al. 2 Terré Tort Draft .11 While the Béteille Proposal originates from a 
a deliberate breach of contract and has lead to an enrichment of the wrongdoer resp. promisor that the 
sole compensatory damages cannot eliminate, the judge can condemn, by a motivated decision, the 
infl ictor of the damage to the payment, in addition to compensatory damages for the harm suff ered in 
accordance with Article 1386–22, of punitive damages, the amount of which may not stand out twice 
the amount of the compensatory damages.
 According to shares decided by the judge, the punitive damages are respectively paid to the victim and 
to a fund which purpose is to compensate harm similar to the one suff ered by the victim. When such a 
fund does not exist, the share of the punitive damages which is not attributed to the victim should be 
paid to the Treasury’. (Transl. CM).
8 Anziani, A. & Béteille, L., Rapport d’information fait au nom de la commission des lois constitutionnelles 
par le groupe de travail relative à la responsabilité civile, n° 558 (2008–2009), released in July 2009 
(www.senat.fr/notice-rapport/2008/r08–558-notice.html). Laurent Béteille and Alain Anziani, both 
former lawyers, are respectively right-wing and left -wing members of the Working Group on Tort Law, 
part of the First Chamber law commission, created in November 2008. Among the three most 
recommended innovations is the allocation of punitive damages in case of lucrative faults, See Anziani 
& Béteille 2009, Recommendation n° 24, p. 7.
9 Béteille Proposal, Exposé des motifs, p. 3. Th e Béteille Proposal contemplates the replacement of the 
present Article 1382 up to Article 1386 by no less than 66 new provisions. Revised Chapter II – Fourth 
Title, Th ird Book – of the Civil Code, entitled ‘De la Responsabilité’, clearly indicates that, like the 
Catala Draft , its scope stretches out beyond tort to contractual liability. Th is fundamental direction 
dictates the rephrasing of Article 1382 where the notion of non-performance of a contractual obligation 
makes its entry. Article 1382 would then sound: ‘Tout fait quelconque de l’homme ou toute contravention 
à une obligation contractuelle, qui cause à autrui un dommage, oblige son auteur à le réparer’. Aft er a 
fi rst section comprising of general provisions, a second one is dedicated to the conditions for one to be 
held liable. Th e third section concentrates on the eff ects of one’s liability and the last section deals with 
two specifi c liability regimes: product liability and liability for traffi  c accidents.
10 Article 1371 Catala Draft  provides that:
 ‘One whose fault is manifestly [deliberate], particularly a [lucrative fault], may be ordered to pay 
punitive damages besides compensatory damages. Th e judge may direct a part of such damages to the 
Treasury. Th e judge must provide specifi c reasons for ordering such punitive damages and must clearly 
distinguish their amount from that of other damages awarded to the victim. Punitive damages may not 
be the subject of a contract of insurance’ (Transl. CM).
 Th is translation departs from the offi  cial one proposed by Levasseur (Levasseur 2008, p. 86) because it 
is, in my view, not faithful to the original text on two decisive elements, namely the translation of 
délibéré as premeditated and the replacement of the expression faute lucrative by an improper 
description.
 About Article 1371 Catala Draft , see Rowan 2009, p. 325 ff , Rowan 2010, p. 513–517 and Borghetti 2009, 
§ 34–46.
11 Article 69 Terré Tort Draft  reads as follows:
 ‘Subject to any specifi c provision, the form and amount of the reparation may have a symbolic reach.
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legislative body, the Catala Draft  and the Terré Tort Draft  are both initiatives of university 
scholars; the only diff erence being that the latter group is composed of an equal number 
of university scholars and legal practitioners. Th e present paragraph provides for further 
insights on the respective general background of the competing punitive damages 
provisions which are examined in par. 3.
2.1. Scope of Application and General Purpose of the Reform
Th e Catala Draft  considers reforming contract law, tort law and prescription law as 
well.12 Th e draft ers’ general purpose is not to depart from the positive law derived from 
Articles 1382–1386 of the Code civil but rather to adjust it (‘le changement dans la 
continuité’): codifi cation through the consolidation of case law is the motto.13 Th is 
especially refl ects the approach followed by the draft ers of the 60 tort law provisions, 
headed by Professor Viney.14 Th e Béteille Proposal which comprises of contractual and 
non-contractual liability rules opts, like the Catala Draft , for the consolidation of judge 
made tort law.15 Th e Terré Tort Draft  focuses on non-contractual liability rules but is part 
of a wider reforming endeavour of the French law of obligation which resulted, in 2009, 
in a reform draft  on contract law – hereaft er Terré Contract Draft .16 In contrast with the 
Catala Draft  and the Béteille Proposal, it seeks to re-codify French tort law by restructuring 
it rather than by consolidating existing case law.17
2.2. Th e Draft s’ Preparatory Works
Th e text of the Catala Draft  encloses preliminary comments regarding its major 
orientations. Unfortunately, the comments on the tort law chapter are silent about the 
motives leading to the adoption of a punitive damages mechanism,18 nor do these 
comments throw light on its specifi c features such as its scope of application or the 
benefi ciaries of the award.19 Th e comments focus instead on the functions of civil 
 When the harm is caused by an intentional fault, the judge may condemn the wrongdoer, by an 
especially reasoned decision, to exemplary damages’ (Transl. CM).
12 About the Catala Draft  in general, see Vogenauer 2009, p. 9–14.
13 Th e draft ers seek to modernise the Code civil in order for it to recover its lost status of ius commune of 
the French law of obligation. Catala 2005, § 2.
14 Viney 2005b, p. 143.
15 Béteille Proposal, Exposé des motifs, p. 3.
16 See F. Terré (ed.), Pour une réforme du droit des contrats, Dalloz: Paris, 2009, 310 p.
17 Terré 2011, § 3–4.
18 Th e introductory comments provide no inventory of legal defi ciencies justifying the introduction into 
general tort law of a repressive mechanism, neither explanations as to the adequacy of punitive damages 
to the problems identifi ed, nor about the method(s) according to which the draft ing group worked, nor 
do they refer to relevant publications on this issue.
19 Shortly before the publication of the Catala Draft , Viney pleaded for a combined restitutionary and 
punitive mechanism conceived to deprive an infl ictor from any profi t deriving from his or her 
wrongdoing – a so-called lucrative fault, with a punitive sanction (‘pénalité’) in order to deter subsequent 
similar wrongdoing. Such a mechanism would stand out, still not abandon, the traditional compensatory 
vision of civil liability as proclaimed by the Cour de cassation. Viney supports that an offi  cial recognition 
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liability,20 its primary function being a compensatory one while Article 1371 Catala 
Draft  forms as a cautious step towards the admissibility of a punitive function of civil 
liability.21
Th e Béteille & Anziani report upon which the Béteille Proposal directly builds, is far 
meatier. It exposes along its 110 pages the principles guiding the reform, identifi es the 
priorities of the reform and formulates for each a series of recommendations. Th ese 
recommendations are based on a study of positive tort law and the consultation of 
national stakeholders.22 It holds a comparative law component which, however, remains 
limited.23 No justifi cation for inserting punitive damages within civil liability law is, 
here also, provided for, still it is indirectly broached. Th e report notices that serious 
damaging behaviour such as lucrative faults benefi t from a gap fl owing from civil and 
criminal law: the gain obtained by the defendant is neither neutralized by civil liability 
law, nor sanctioned by criminal law.24
One of the distinctive features of the Terré Tort Draft  is precisely the impact of 
comparative law,25 fi rst, on the identifi cation process of the striking features of French 
tort law and corresponding reform priorities and second, on the proposed solutions.26 
Th e infl uence of comparative law on the treatment of lucrative faults and punitive 
damages is tangible.27 A justifi cation for the insertion of exemplary damages is to punt 
an end to the judicial practice of covert punitive damages.28
Th e doctrine prior to the Catala Draft  had already paved the way for the discussion 
about the introduction of punitive damages and provided for justifi cations.29 Th e debate 
closely involved lucrative faults. A common perception is that, in response to lacuna’s in 
of punitive damages, now applied in a disguised way, would lead to the adoption of an adequate regime 
insofar that its scope of application would be clearly defi ned, excesses could be sanctioned and 
insurability against punitive awards be excluded. Th is, as a result, would reinforce the effi  cacy of such 
a mechanism as well as legal security in general. A major motive behind the proposed incorporation 
into the Civil Code of punitive damages is thus to bring the theory of the law of the book in accordance 
with the practice of law in action. Th e required adequacy between the compensation awarded, on one 
hand, and the harm suff ered, on the other hand, the so-called réparation intégrale rule which excludes 
any infl uence of the seriousness of the infringement on the amount of damages, has indeed been in 
practice bypassed either by lower courts judge or the legislator. See Viney 2005a, § I.
20 Viney 2005b, p. 148.
21 Th ough not recognised as a specifi c function of tort law, preventive function is indirectly admitted in 
Article 1369–1 Catala Draft  dealing with specifi c relief (Article 1369–1 Catala Draft ).
22 See Anziani & Béteille 2009, p. 129 ff .
23 Th e Anziani & Béteille report contains a brief description of punitive damages under common law, 
Anziani & Béteille 2009, p. 29.
24 Anziani & Béteille 2009, p. 80 & 88. Th e reporters further assert that the claim for the introduction of 
punitive damages would not be as loud if criminal courts would award higher amount of civil damages 
to victims of a criminal off ence. Th e reporters observe that criminal judges award far lower amount of 
damages than their civil counterparts, as a result one of their recommendations is to tackle this ‘cultural 
diff erence’. Anziani & Béteille 2009, p. 89. Comp. with Law Commission Report § 1.15.
25 Th e other one being the choice for restructuring of French tort law.
26 See Rémy 2011, p. 43 and Rémy & Borghetti 2011, p. 67.
27 Rémy-Corlais 2011, p. 200–201 & p. 222.
28 See below § 3.1.3.
29 See e.g. Carval 1995, Fasquelle 2002, § 21–35, Jourdain 2002, § 7–11, Viney 2002, p. 66.
P
R
O
EF
 1
Punitive Damages in the Competing Reform Draft s of the French Civil Code
264
civil and criminal legislation,30 lower civil judges have, when assessing the award for non-
pecuniary losses and exercising thereby their sovereign power of appreciation, taken into 
account the seriousness of the defendant’s conduct.31 Codifying punitive damages would 
end the legal uncertainty created by such covert practices32 and reel off  the law in the books 
and the law in action. Punitive damages are considered an eff ective legal tool due to their 
dissuasive eff ect on potential wrongdoers,33 as well as their incentive impact on victims as 
well.34 Th e discussion also points at possible risks linked to punitive damages, such as the 
possible undue enrichment of the victim and an increase in damages claim which would 
plagued lower jurisdictions.35 Th ough civil fi nes would avoid such consequences as they 
are paid to the public treasury, this device, due its maximum amount, lacks fl exibility.36
2.3. Punitive Damages Provisions: Main Focus and Context
Th e draft  provisions on punitive damages introduce a signifi cant exception to the 
réparation intégrale principle which all three draft s propose to codify.37 Th ough signifi cant, 
because this exception acknowledges the punitive function of civil liability in addition to 
its traditional compensatory one, it is nevertheless meant to apply in limited cases.
Article 1386–25 Béteille Proposal and Article 1371 Catala Draft  focus both on so-called 
lucrative faults. Article 1371 Catala Draft  lacks precision as to its exact scope of application 
and the assessment of the damages award, leaving its further interpretation to the judge.
Article 1386–25 Béteille Proposal is, in contrast, characterised by a clear-cut scope of 
application and an upper limit for the amount of damages to be allocated. As the principle 
of full reparation (réparation intégrale) dictates, the seriousness of the damaging 
30 Jourdain 2002, § 8, Viney 2002, § II.A.
31 See e.g. Jourdain 2002, § 7, Fasquelle 2002, § 21–24 (case law analysis), Borghetti 2009, § 22–30 (with 
case law illustrations). Apparently one also encounters such practices in Italian and German civil case 
law, see e.g. Anziani & Béteille 2009, p. 84.
32 Fasquelle 2002, § 24.
33 Viney depicts the full reparation principle, which ignores the seriousness of the defendant’s conduct 
and the gains he or she made by his or her wrongdoing, as an incentive to commit an infringement (‘un 
pousse-au-crime)’, Viney 2002, § 1. She further stresses the shortcoming of that principle as ‘it is 
delusion’ when applied to non-pecuniary losses.
34 Fasquelle 2002, § 27.
35 Ibid., § 35.
36 About civil fi nes see above note 3. Fasquelle 2002, § 31. For a comparison between the device of civil 
fi nes and punitive damages see Behar-Touchais 2002, esp. § 15–23.
37 Th e réparation intégrale rule, a founding principle placed ahead of the reparation chapter of each draft s, 
is stated at:
 Article 1370 in the Catala Draft  which purpose is ‘to place the victim as far as possible in the position 
he would have been in had the act created liability not occurred’ whereby the damages awarded ‘should 
produce neither profi t nor loss for the victim’, Transl. Levasseur 2008 p. 86;
 Article 1386–24 in the Béteille Proposal which reads: ‘L’allocation de dommages et intérêts a pour objet 
de replacer la victime dans la situation où elle se serait trouvée si le fait dommageable n’avait pas eu lieu, 
de sorte qu’il n’en résulte pour elle ni perte ni profi t. (…)’;
 Article 49 in the Terré Tort Draft  whereby ‘La victime d’un dommage peut en général demander 
réparation de son entier préjudice (…). La réparation tend à placer le demandeur dans la situation où il 
se trouverait si le dommage ne lui avait pas été causé; il ne peut en principe en résulter pour lui ni perte, 
ni profi t’ (ital. CM).
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behaviour is, in principle, not taken into account when determining the amount of 
damages to be awarded, thereby excluding its punitive character. Repressive trends in 
French case law and legislation, however, tempers the unqualifi ed character of this 
founding principle, as the Béteille & Anziani report observes. While the consultation 
conducted by the First Chamber Working Group on Tort Law does not reveal any 
consensus,38 the reporters nevertheless see punitive damages as an ‘interesting 
innovation’ whose introduction into French private law ought to be ‘moderate’.39 Th e key 
issue to them is not whether a repressive mechanism like punitive damages has a place 
within French civil liability, but rather whether such a legal mechanism ought to be 
generalised. Despite the reporters’ eff orts to meet the criticism expressed against Article 
1371 Catala Draft , reluctance to this innovation remains.40
In the Terré Tort Draft , punitive damages (Article 69) are directed against intentional 
violation of one’s moral integrity. Th e Terré draft ing group indeed views the restitution of 
profi ts as an adequate sanction against lucrative faults of non-contractual (Article 54 Terré 
Tort Draft ) and contractual basis (Article 120 Terré Contract Draft  dealing with dol).41
3. Detailed Comparative Analysis of Competing Provisions
In the following paragraphs the distinctive features of the three competing punitive 
damages provisions will be compared. Attention will be paid especially to the damaging 
behaviour they aim at sanctioning, the setting off  of the damages award, its benefi ciaries 
and insurability.
3.1. Damaging Behaviour: Lucrative Faults versus Infringement of One’s 
Moral Integrity
3.1.1. Th e Imprecision of Article 1371 Catala Draft 
Article 1371 Catala Draft  formulates a general rule that applies to ‘manifestly deliberate 
[faults], particularly (…)’ – thus not exclusively – to lucrative faults.42 For punitive 
38 Interviews were conducted with economic actors representing the business sector as well as consumers’ 
interests, and also with legal practitioners, magistrates and representatives of judges’ organisations. 
Academics were also interviewed among which draft ers of the Catala Draft . Th ese interviews reveal a 
total absence of consensus about punitive damages and an opposition between, on the one hand, 
academics which are rather favourable towards the introduction of punitive damages in French law 
and, on the other hand, economic actors and legal practitioners which are globally reluctant to it. 
Th ough the necessity of legislative action against certain damaging behaviours such as lucrative faults 
is widely shared, doubts rise about punitive damages as being the appropriate legal tool to combat these. 
Anziani & Béteille 2009, p. 79–100.
39 Anziani & Béteille 2009, p. 88, § 4.
40 See Vignolle 2010, § II.B, who strongly opposes the vision that civil liability might endorse a punitive 
function.
41 See above note 5.
42 Levasseur translated the expression faute lucrative by ‘fault whose purpose is monetary gain’ which is 
an incorrect translation because it departs from the defi nition given to this notion by the Catala Draft . 
Th is translation unduly suggests that the application of Article 1371 supposes that the wrongdoer not 
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damages to be awarded is further required that the damaging behaviour opens a right to 
compensatory damages. Furthermore, aAArt. 1371 Catala Draft  is non-sector specifi c 
and applies to contractual breach as well as to non-contractual wrong (Article 1340 
Catala Draft ). It clearly breaks away from the réparation intégrale principle as it associates 
the damages award with the seriousness of the behaviour of the infl ictor.43
Article 1371 Catala Draft  introduces two new types of ‘ faute’, that are the ‘ faute 
manisfestement délibérée’ and the ‘ faute lucrative’, the latter being a species of the former. 
Th e faute lucrative is described as ‘a wrongdoing, the benefi cial consequences of which 
– for the wrongdoer – are not neutralised by the sole compensation of the harm caused’ 
(transl. CM).44 Th e general category of ‘manifestly deliberate fault’ is a notion which does 
not originate from the Civil Code, nor case law. Although new, this category is 
characterised neither by a Draft  provision, nor by the preliminary comments and remains 
therefore imprecise.45 One could associate this category with – but not assimilate it to 
– already existing concepts, such as the notion of faute volontaire, a deliberate wrongful 
act, or faute intentionnelle, whereby the infl ictor intentionally sought the harmful 
consequences of his wrongful behaviour.46
Th is lack of precision led to heavy criticism from e.g. the Cour de cassation.47 What 
is here at stake is obviously, from the perspective of the infl ictor, the exact determination 
of behaviour falling into the grip of punitive damages, thus legal security. Th ose who 
point out such imprecision as to Article 1371’s scope of application, fear that its 
interpretation, de facto imposed on the judge, would pave the way to inconsistencies and 
even, arbitrary punitive damages awards.48Th e deterrent impact of this mechanism 
would be sensibly limited if the victim is required to prove the intention of the wrongdoer 
to profi t from his damaging behaviour, as proving such intention is diffi  cult. Such 
only wittingly committed a damaging act but also intended the resulting fi nancial profi t. Article 1371 
Catala Draft  remains unclear on that point.
43 Chagny 2006, § 8, Méadel 2007, § 5.
44 Th e concept is – only – defi ned in the preliminary comments, Viney 2005b, p. 148. Th e characterisation 
of a fault as lucrative thus does not include the intention of the wrongdoer to fi nancially profi t from his 
or her behaviour. A distinctive characteristic of this provision lies in its non-sector specifi c scope of 
application.
45 Th e picture becomes even more blurred when looking at Viney’s position expressed prior to publication 
of the Catala draft . Indeed, according to her, punitive damages should not sanction fautes intentionnelles 
from which the wrongdoer did not obtain any profi t, because these faults are already sanctioned by 
their non-insurability (Article L. 113–1 Insurance Code). Viney 2005a, § I. Given its formulation, 
Article 1371 primarily aims at ‘manifestly deliberate fault’ and possibly applies to faute intentionnelle 
which would then fall within this general category. Méadel 2007, § 5.
46 See e.g. Fabre-Magnan 2004, § 279. Th e concept of faute volontaire had lost material relevancy in present 
civil liability, see e.g. Fabre-Magnan 2004, p. 758–761.
47 For this very reason, this concept as well as the concept of fautes lucratives is not only labelled as 
imprecise but fi rstly as improper by the Cour de cassation. Rapport Cour de cassation 2007, p. 68–69. 
According to the Supreme Court, draft ers should avoid departing from existing concepts of fault, a 
quite conservative approach as it implicitly excludes innovations on that matter.
48 Rapport Cour de cassation 2007, p. 68–69, Méadel 2007, § 10, Dreyer 2008, § 7, Pierre 2010, § I. Th e 
latter also pinpoints the twofold requirement of a manifestly and deliberate fault, which excessively 
narrows the application scope of Article 1371 Catala Draft  to ‘intelligent faults’ and faults ‘nurtured by 
the wrongdoer’.
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requirement would subsequently restrict the availability of punitive damages and thereby 
the protection of victims.
In a similar vein, Pierre highlights the twofold requirement of a manifestly and 
deliberate fault, which, he views, limits the application of Article 1371 Catala Draft  to 
‘intelligent faults’ and faults ‘nurtured by the infl ictor’.1 A more general issue is also the 
diffi  culty in establishing the lucrative character of a fault and the causality between the 
harmful act or contractual breach, on one hand, and the exact resulting profi t for the 
wrongdoer, on the other hand.2
More fundamental criticism relates to the rupture with civil liability founding 
principles operated by Article 1371: sanctioning the seriousness of the behaviour of the 
infl ictor confl icts with the neutrality of the damages towards the gravity of the 
wrongdoing. Th is approach is considered as contrary to the ethic of civil liability because 
it would turn civil liability into ‘para-criminal’ liability.3
Th e draft ers of Article 1386–25 Béteille Proposal took account of the criticism, but 
headed, nevertheless, into the same direction.
3.1.2. Article 1386–25 Béteille Proposal: a Clear Response to Article 1371’s 
Shortcomings
Article 1386–25 Béteille Proposal applies (1) when the law expressly provides so, (2) the 
prejudice results from a deliberate wrong (faute délictuelle volontaire) or a deliberate 
breach of contract (3) opening right to compensatory award for the victim and (4) leading 
to profi t for the responsible wrongdoer respectively the promisor. Contrary to the Catala 
Draft , the Béteille Proposal favours a sector-specifi c approach as punitive damages only 
apply ‘in cases where, the law expressly states so’. Article 1386–25 characterises in general 
terms the damaging behaviour to be punished, thereby justifying its incorporation into 
the Code civil.
An obvious consequence of Article 1386–25’s formulation is that the eff ective 
introduction of punitive damages into French civil liability requires further legislative 
action. Given the reluctance towards this alien legal concept,4 such a requirement paves 
the way for postponement.
In contrast with Article 1371 Catala Draft , under Article 1386–25 punitive damages 
do not sanction all lucrative faults. Taking over a fundamental criticism against Article 
1371, the Béteille & Anziani report excludes a general punitive damages provision on the 
ground that it would seriously undermine the fundamental distinction between civil and 
criminal liability.5 Th e reporters also question that punitive damages have, in essence, a 
general preventive function against all lucrative faults and thereby oppose the necessity 
1 Pierre 2010, § I.
2 Dreyer 2008, § 8.
3 Mésa 2009, § I-A.
4 See e.g. the reluctance expressed by several consultees in Anziani & Béteille 2009, p. 86–88.
5 Such general provision would also re-introduce the concept of private penalty (peine privée) which 
French law has continuously combated. Th e Report further construes the call for a general punitive 
damages provision as a supposed answer to the unjustifi ed diff erences between damages awarded by 
criminal judges compared to their civil counterparts. Th e reporters recommend – as better solution – 
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of a general punitive damages provisions.6 Instead, they identify specifi c legal fi elds 
where punitive damages could apply as in those fi elds, the reporters view,7 neither civil 
nor criminal law insure a just compensation for the harm suff ered and an effi  cient 
sanction of the infl ictor. Th anks to its general characterisation of deliberate and lucrative 
faults, this provision is meant to set out a framework for further legislation and judicial 
action and to ensure the internal coherence of the legal policy against such behaviour. 
Two of the scarce commentators of the Béteille & Anziani report challenge the sector-
based approach. One commentator fears that contract and consumer law will not benefi t 
from this innovation.8 Th e other pleads that the general application of punitive damages 
would free the judge from any reluctance to allocate such awards which he considers 
desirable.9 If, as Article 1386–25 states, further sector-specifi c legislation is required, its 
major impact is therefore beyond all the offi  cial recognition, in line with the Catala Draft , 
and also, therefore, of the repressive function of civil liability beside its traditional 
compensatory role.10
Article 1386–25 targets deliberate acts (wrongdoing resp. breach).11 It does not require 
that the infl ictor intended to make profi t out of the wrongdoing respectively breach.12 By 
employing an existing and well characterised concept, the draft ers avoid the lack of 
precision that Article 1371 was criticised for.13 Th is choice also responds to conservative 
criticism of the Cour de cassation.14
Th e central role of lucrative faults in both Article 1371 Catala Draft  and 1386–25 
Béteille Proposal reveals a line of continuity but reluctance towards the codifi cation of 
that damages awards allocated by criminal judges – when also deciding a civil claim – at least equal 
those of their civil counterparts. See Anziani & Béteille 2009, p. 89–90, Recommandation n° 22.
6 Th e reporters consider punitive damages as ineff ective in cases where victims, especially in consumer 
confl icts, have no economic interest to act in justice due to the low damages award expected compared 
to the high costs of a lawsuit. Th e introduction of class actions instead would tackle these situations. 
Anziani & Béteille 2009, p. 91–93, Recommandation n° 23.
7 First mentioned are personality rights relating e.g. to ones privacy or reputation, secondly competition 
law and also environmental law, Anziani & Béteille 2009, p. 93–95.
8 Mésa 2009, § I.B.
9 Pierre 2010, § I.B.1. Th is author further signals the risk that a cumulating of sector-based provisions 
might create distortions and incoherence.
10 Outside these fi elds, it could provide a ground for lawyers to contest the high level of damages allocated 
to a victim compared to the harm suff ered, especially in presence of a lucrative fault and when the 
judicial decision does not indicate that the damages awarded aim at compensating the material and 
immaterial harm suff ered as well. Th ey could then pretend that, given the substantial amount of 
damages allocated to a victim, the judge covertly awarded punitive damages contrary to Article 1386–
25. Article 1386–25 Béteille Proposal requires indeed the judge awarding punitive damages to motivate 
its decision.
11 About the concept of faute volontaire, see above § 3.1.1. One fi rst notice that the expression faute 
lucrative, present in Article 1371 Catala Draft , has here disappeared from Article 1386–25 Béteille 
Proposal and has instead been replaced by a description which strongly resembles though the defi nition 
the Catala Draft  opted for.
12 As a result, situations where the author of an unwitting harmful act, profi ts from it, fall out of 
Article 1386–25 scope.
13 See above § 3.1.1. Th e burden of the proof of the faute volontaire still implicitly lies on the victim but 
could be reversed in the sector specifi c legislation.
14 See above footnote 36.
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this concept nevertheless remains. Commenting on the Béteille & Anziani report, 
Vignolle, a legal practitioner, contests the need for legislative recognition of the concept 
of lucrative faults. He suggests instead that, when lucrative faults do not qualify as a 
criminal infraction, which, in his view, they usually do, judges treat these as a fraudulent 
breach of contract (faute dolosive, Article 1150 Code civil). A victim might on this ground 
claim and obtain compensation for foreseeable and unforeseeable damage as well as for 
the special and immaterial harm suff ered which, according to Vignolle, renders any 
recourse to punitive damages superfl uous.15
3.1.3. Articles 68 and 69 Terré Tort Draft : a Total Shift  of Focus
Intentional infringement of one’s moral integrity and not lucrative faults are at the heart 
of the punitive damage provision of the Terré Tort Draft .
If this draft  also deals with fautes lucratives (Article 54 Terré Tort Draft ) these are 
sanctioned by the siphoning-off  of the infl ictor’s profi ts.16 Th e Terré Tort Draft  favours 
restitutionary above punitive damages as an adequate remedy against lucrative faults,17 
on the ground that punitive awards are excluded by the Draft  Common Frame of 
Reference and might be considered as contrary to public order according to the Rome II 
Regulation.18
Article 69 Terré Tort Draft , conditions allocation of punitive damages to a twofold 
requirement: an intentional infringement and an infringement of one’s moral integrity 
which comprises of e.g. one’s dignity, honour, reputation or privacy. Here again, the 
seriousness of the damaging behaviour – its intentional character combined to a specifi c 
category of infringement – is taken into account for the assessment of the damages 
award, this being contrary to positive law. To justify the resulting restricted application 
of punitive damages, the draft ers observe that such approach is in line in with English 
common law where they are awarded in very limited cases.19
Th e Draft ers consider that rights relating to personal integrity deserve, as it is now 
the case in positive law, a specifi c and high level of protection (Article 68 Terré Tort 
Draft ),20 but also, if not most of all, a declared judicial policy of protection.21 According 
to the traditional full reparation principle, damages ought to compensate no less, but no 
more than the harm caused. Th e assessment of damages becomes highly problematic, 
however, when the infringement leads to non-patrimonial prejudice, as in the case of 
15 Vignolle 2010, § II.B.
16 See for general comments Rémy & Borghetti 2011, p. 82.
17 Rémy-Corlay, member of the draft ing group, observes that, in France, restitutionary and punitive 
award tend to be mixed up because they depart from the founding principle of full reparation. Rémy-
Corlais 2011, p. 200.
18 See Comment C on Article VI.-6:101 DCFR and cons. 32 of Regulation 864/2007.
19 Ibid.
20 Article 9 Code civil states that these rights have constitutional value. According to constant case law, 
the sole proof of the infringement is suffi  cient to ground a compensation award (e.g. Cass. civ. 1e, 
5 novembre 1996, Bull. civ. I, n° 38).
21 Rémy & Borghetti 2011, p. 86.
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infringement of one’s moral integrity.22 Lower court judges assess non-patrimonial harm 
by using their sovereign power of appreciation and are not required to specify or explain 
their decision as to the amount allocated.23 Article 69 Terré Tort Draft  echoes the 
perception that lower judges presently use that sovereign power, and subsequent absence 
of a duty to give reasons, to infl ict high amount of damages in case of non-pecuniary 
damage in order to sanction the seriousness of certain damaging behaviour while, on the 
face, they are abiding to the mandatory principle of full reparation.24 By adopting a 
punitive damages provision, the Terré Tort Draft  expressly aims at offi  cially recognising 
that the reparation of harm caused by an infringement of one’s moral integrity falls 
outside the scope of the full compensation principle.25 Th e draft ers’ purpose here is to 
end:
‘l’hypocrisie actuelle, qui se contente d’imposer au juge du fond le respect formel du principe 
de réparation intégrale et le laisse arbitrer librement la mesure de la réparation, sous couvert 
du principe d’appréciation souveraine’.26
For its draft ers, Article 69 Terré Tort Draft  is meant to clarify and to consolidate an 
existing judicial practice.
3.2. Th e Assessment of the Punitive Award
Article 1371 Catala Draft  foresees that a wrongdoer respectively promisor who benefi ts 
from her manifestly deliberate fault ‘may be ordered to pay punitive damages besides 
compensatory damages’. Th e proposed sanction is thus additional to compensatory 
award and not automatic but to be decided by the judge. Here again, Article 1371 as well 
as the ‘Exposé des motifs’ are silent as to the exact characterisation and calculation of the 
award.27 It is, consequently, for the judge to determine 1) whether the award be allocated 
2) whether it should be based on e.g. the harm caused to the victim or the subsequent 
benefi t made by the infl ictor or promisor and 3) according to which proportion. Article 
1371 imposes a duty to justify specifi cally his or her decision. Th e punitive character of 
this award derives from the fact that it is additional to compensatory damages and 
directed against a specifi c category of harmful behaviour.
22 Rémy-Corlais 2011, p. 222.
23 See e.g. Fabre-Magnan 2004, § 339, Le Tourneau & Cadiet 2007, at § 2511: ‘C’est une vérité incontestable 
pour la Cour régulatrice que le juge du fond justifi e suffi  samment l’évaluation d’un préjudice par le seul 
énoncé du chiff re retenu, sans être tenu d’en préciser les divers éléments (…), chiff re dont l’équivalence 
avec le préjudice causé est simplement affi  rmé, même s’il s’agit [de l’euro] dit symbolique’. According to 
these authors, the Supreme Court even encourages lower judges, by its judicial policy, not to disclose 
the underlying assessment of their awards for non-pecuniary losses. See Le Tourneau & Cadiet 2007, at 
§ 2512.
24 See above § 2.2.
25 Rémy & Borghetti 2011, op.cit.
26 Ibid.
27 In her comments prior to the publication of the Draft , Viney is supportive of a penalty (pénalité) 
combined with a benefi t-based award – she labelled as being punitive – depriving the wrongdoer of all 
profi t gained as a result of his wrongdoing or contractual default. Viney 2005a, § I.
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Th is proposition encountered much critical response, mainly of a fundamental 
nature, while some comments concentrated on more technical aspects. In general, 
opponents do not contend the necessity of intervening against lucrative faults but fi ercely 
oppose the introduction of punitive damages into French civil liability where 
compensation of the harm suff ered is central and not punishment of a given behaviour. 
Th e adoption of such a punishment mechanism introduces, in their view, a confusion 
between the respective functions of civil liability law and criminal law.28 For proper 
legislative action against lucrative faults, some opponents refer to criminal and 
administrative law arguing that rather than reforming civil liability law, criminal law 
ought instead to be reformed in order to tackle the phenomenon of lucrative faults.29 
Alternative solutions within the frame of civil liability, however, have been suggested. 
Méadel favours a mechanism which would take into account the benefi t made by the 
wrongdoer.30 Pierre, though not fundamentally opposed to punitive damages, strongly 
disapproves of Article 1371 for not specifying the mode of calculation of the punitive 
award.31 He views the absence of an upper limit as a wide open doorway to the ordering 
of excessive awards, a threat to ‘the economic equilibrium of civil liability’. Th e specifi c 
motivation duty that Article 1371 imposes on judges – and subsequent judicial control 
– is apparently not considered as a suffi  cient safeguard against such judicial 
arbitrariness.
Article 1386–25 Béteille Proposal labels, just like Article 1371 Catala Draft , the 
remedy to apply in case of lucrative faults as punitive damages. Th is award is, as in Article 
1371, non-automatic, additional to compensatory damages and the decision whether 
such an award should be allocated is entrusted to the judge who Article 1386–25 expressly 
requires to render ‘a reasoned decision’. Th e calculation mechanism of punitive awards is 
a major concern expressed by consultees in the Béteille & Anziani report.32 Th e 
fundamental diff erence between both draft  provisions relates subsequently to the 
assessment of a punitive damages award. Article 1386–25 defi nes its basis and delimits 
its amount, thereby strongly restraining the discretionary power ascribed to the judge 
under Article 1371 Catala Draft .
Article 1386–25’s explicit limitation of the punitive award to twice the amount of the 
compensatory damages is inspired by fear of excessive damages awards.33 Under French 
law, the assessment of damages is, as earlier mentioned, a matter of discretionary power 
of lower courts. Given the absence of judicial control by the Supreme Court on that 
factual aspect, the reporters consider it essential to limit statutorily the amount of 
28 Rapport Cour de cassation 2007, § 92, Dreyer 2008, § 13.
29 Rapport Cour de cassation 2007, p. 69 in fi ne, Dreyer 2008, § 15.
30 Méadel [Méadel 2007, § 26] who is also critical towards sanctioning lucrative faults by the allocation of 
punitive damages nuances, though, the alleged incompatibility between this punitive mechanism and 
the primary function of liability as incarnated in the founding principle of réparation intégrale. To her, 
the incompatibility argument is little convincing since the réparation intégrale principle is not 
mandatory (d’ordre public), as attested by the many legislative provisions which depart from it. See on 
that issue e.g. Borghetti 2009, § 3–21.
31 Pierre 2010, § II.B.
32 Anziani & Béteille 2009, p. 95.
33 Ibid, p. 97.
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punitive damages that a judge may award.34 Consultees also warned for a possible rebuff  
of this provision by the Constitutional Council if the amount of punitive damages is not 
limited in one way or another.35 Coming to the basis for assessment of the punitive 
damages, the Béteille & Anziani report recommended that it be proportional to the 
compensatory damages allocated, a recommendation to which Article 1386–25 abides. 
Th e purpose of this provision, however, is to sanction and deter deliberate harmful 
behaviour from which one had fi nancially benefi ted. One would thus expect that the 
calculation basis for punitive damages would be the benefi t made rather than the 
compensatory damages.
Several authors question the dissuasive eff ect of punitive damages as designed in 
Article 1386–25 Béteille Proposal.36 Mésa pleads for an alternative solution: the principle 
of full restitution.37 Restitution is not only faithful to the founding principle of full 
reparation, but its deterrent impact on lucrative faults is also stronger as it deprives the 
infl ictor of the subsequent profi ts.38 Again, the punitive device of Article 1386–25 bases 
the award calculation on the harm caused, not on the wrongful profi ts whereas it purports 
to impede wrongful lucrative behaviour.
Article 69 Terré Tort Draft , fi rst provides that in case of an infringement of one’s 
moral integrity, ‘the form and amount of damages may be symbolic’. It then states that 
when such infringement is intentional, ‘the judge may condemn the infl ictor (..) to an 
exemplary reparation’.39 Th e sanction is not automatic but to be decided by the judge and 
is not conditioned to any compensatory award. It is for the judge to decide whether the 
award be allocated and what its amount ought to be.
Th e decision as to the allocation of exemplary damages depends on the discretionary 
power of the judge, a common scheme between all three competing draft s. Furthermore, 
the Terré Tort Draft  does not specify any calculation basis, nor provide for an upper limit 
of the punitive award. Despite critical comments on Article 1371 Catala Draft  on these 
two aspects, the Terré draft ing group opted for a similar approach. Indeed, in contrast 
34 Ibid, p. 96.
35 Ibid, p. 87. Punitive damages might be assimilated to a repressive mechanism, all the more if it is 
insuffi  ciently delimited. It should thus conform to the required proportionality between penalty and 
incriminated behaviour (Article 8 of the Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme) to avoid being declared 
unconstitutional by the Constitutional Council. Th e reporters took account of this remark, Anziani & 
Béteille 2009, p. 96.
36 Vignolle 2010, § I.A., Mésa 2009, § II.A.
37 Mésa 2009, § II.A, Th e latter is indeed the mirror image of the fi rst since it also aims at restoring the 
status quo ante but focuses on the wrongdoer instead of the victim. Th is change of perspective presents 
several comparative advantages. Contrary to punitive damages, a restitutionary award contains no 
repressive component and appears therefore compatible with the traditional compensatory function of 
civil liability and abides as well to the constitutional principle of légalité des peines. Th e author also sees 
as a further advantage the fact that the seriousness of the fault has, in line with the full reparation 
principle, no impact on the assessment of the restitutionary damages, since the focus is on the gain 
realised by the defendant.
38 Mésa 2009, § II.B.
39 Article 69 uses the expression ‘réparation exemplaire’ and not ‘dommages et intérêts punitifs’ in contrast 
to the two other competing draft  provisions. It is in line with the recommendation of the British Law 
Commission report on that issue, see Law Commission Report, recommendation n° 16, p. 184.
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with the Article 1386–25 Béteille Proposal,40 Article 69 al. 2 Terré Tort Draft  fully 
entrusts the assessment of the amount of exemplary damages to the wisdom of the lower 
judge. But Article 69 requires an especially reasoned judicial decision, like Article 1371,41 
with a view to enable its judicial control by upper courts.42 Th e Terré draft ers apparently 
consider this requirement as a suffi  cient safeguard against the risk of arbitrary damages 
award, oft en associated with punitive damages and feared by many French commentators. 
Article 1386–25 only imposes a ‘reasoned decision’, favouring thereby a statutory to 
procedural protection against such risks.
None of the competing provisions indicate if the victim should claim punitive 
damages, due to the reparatory function of the award, or whether the initiative belongs 
to the judge, due to the punitive character of the award.
3.3. Th e Benefi ciaries of the Award
When it comes to the designation of the benefi ciary of the award to be paid by the 
infl ictor, the French legal community seems even more divided than regarding the 
previous items.
Once more, Article 1371 Catala Draft  stands out by its imprecision. Article 1386–25 
Béteille Proposal echoes critical comments toward the latter but heads nevertheless for 
the same direction: the plurality of benefi ciaries. Th is approach might appear quite 
peculiar to common law lawyers. Th e Terré Tort Draft  here again diff erentiates itself by 
pointing out the victim as the exclusive benefi ciary of the punitive award.
Article 1371 Catala Draft  states that the judge, when ordering the payment of punitive 
damages ‘may direct part of such damages to the Treasury (Ital. CM)’, thereby implicitly 
providing that the – other part of the – award is to be primarily allocated to the victim, as 
compensatory damages are.43 Th is choice of benefi ciaries, about which the draft ers 
comments remain silent, unleashed mainly negative reactions. Commentators oppose the 
allocation of an additional award to the victim and also contest the Treasury being an 
appropriate benefi ciary. To Dreyer, the allotment of a punitive award to the victim 
potentially leads to his or her unjust enrichment.44 Th e Cour de cassation further signals its 
non-conformity with the compensatory purpose of civil liability where neutrality of the 
award for the victim is central.45 Following a more pragmatic approach, Chagny positively 
views the allocation of punitive damages to victims as it constitutes an incentive for the 
same to intervene against lucrative, wrongful behaviour. Civil liability serves then as a 
private enforcement tool which directly benefi ts the victim but indirectly the community 
40 Th e formulation of Article 1386–25 Béteille Proposal reveals the draft ers’ intention to address the risk 
of arbitrary judicial decisions.
41 Departing from positive law, all competing draft s enjoin the judge allocating punitive or exemplary 
damages to motivate his or her decision. Article 1371 Catala Draft  (‘specifi c reason’) and 69 al. 2 Terré 
Tort Draft  (‘décision spécialement motivée’) even impose a specifi cally reasoned decision.
42 Rémy & Borghetti 2011, p. 86.
43 Comp. with Méadel 2007, § 23–24. As Article 1371 does not explicitly mention the victim as benefi ciary 
of the punitive award, Méadel sees the Treasury as the sole benefi ciary.
44 Dreyer 2008, § 9, contra Pierre 2010, § II.A.2.
45 Rapport Cour de cassation 2007, § 92, p. 69.
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as well.46 As to the allocation of the punitive award to the Treasury, the Cour de cassation 
characterises it as ‘weird’.47 If implemented, it would create a confusion between the concept 
of punitive damages as understood in common law and the device of civil fi nes (amende 
civile) with which French private law is familiar.48 Th e highest Court thus suggests that the 
punitive award be instead assigned to a compensation fund (fonds d’indemnisation).
Article 1386–25 Béteille Proposal also foresees a plurality of benefi ciaries: part of the 
punitive damages is to be directed to the victim and another part to a fund which purpose 
is to compensate losses as suff ered by the victim. In the absence of such fund, its share 
should benefi t the Treasury. Th e Béteille & Anziani Report revealed that consultees were 
strongly divided on the issue of the benefi ciaries of the punitive damages.49 Despite the 
lack of consensus, the Béteille & Anziani Report recommends that the award be allocated 
in part to the victim. Th e reporters deem it to be of the essence of punitive damages that 
the victim be a benefi ciary. Still they partly side with the Cour de cassation when 
proposing that part of the award be allocated to an indemnifi cation fund, prior to public 
treasury. Also contested by the consultees is the choice, in Article 1371 Catala Draft , to 
charge the judge with the decision whether or not to direct part of the award to another 
benefi ciary than the victim.50 Article 1386–25 Béteille Proposal diverges slightly from 
Article 1371 Catala on that point too: the plurality of benefi ciaries is codifi ed while the 
designation of the benefi ciary fund and the proportion of the award it is to receive is a 
matter of sovereign power of the lower judge. Again, the Béteille Proposal builds upon 
Article 1371 Catala Draft  but attempts to avoid its shortcomings.
Neither the text of Article 69 Terré Tort Draft , nor the draft ers comments, explicitly 
designate the benefi ciary of the punitive damages. It clearly follows though from the 
system of Articles 68 and 69 Terré Tort Draft . According to Article 68 Terré Tort Draft , 
any person can obtain reparation of (non-)patrimonial harm caused by the infringement 
of his or her moral integrity. Th e originality of the Terré Tort Draft  lies in the fact that the 
victim can be a private individual as well as a legal entity. Legal entities, Article 68 Terré 
Tort Draft  stipulates, may claim for reparation, provided, however, they are the victim of 
serious fault (faute grave). It then follows from Article 69 Terré Tort Draft  that the (victim’s) 
reparation right, based on Article 68 might either be a symbolic award or exemplary 
damages. Contrary to both the Catala Draft  and Béteille Proposal, the victim, according 
to the Terré group, is thus the sole benefi ciary of the exemplary damages. Th is constitutes 
a far stronger incentive for the victim whose moral integrity has intentionally been 
damaged to take legal action; thereby increasing the deterrent impact of this provision.
46 Chagny 2006, § 14, p. 1226.
47 It furthermore renders obscure the purpose aimed at by this repressive mechanism, Rapport Cour de 
cassation 2007, § 92, p. 69. See also Méadel 2007, § 24.
48 See supra note 3.
49 A consumer organisation pleads for the exclusive allocation of the punitive award to the victim, see also 
Pierre 2010, § II.A.2. On the contrary, the Cour de cassation and Ministry of Justice exclude the victim 
as a benefi ciary who would then enjoy a double compensation as, in practice, the seriousness of the 
behaviour oft en infl uences the compensation award of non-patrimonial harm. A critic oft en heard is 
that allocating punitive damages to the victim constitutes a private penalty. In order to avoid that, 
many suggested that the punitive damages be instead exclusively directed to a specifi c indemnifi cation 
fund. Anziani & Béteille 2009, p. 98.
50 Anziani & Béteille 2009, p. 99.
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3.4. Th e Insurability Issue
Before looking at how the competing draft s deal with the insurability of punitive award, 
attention must be paid to the legal context of that issue. Especially relevant here is Article 
L.113–1 of the Insurance Code, the second paragraph of which provides that ‘the insurer 
shall not be answerable for losses and damage caused by the insured person’s intentional 
wrongdoing or fraud’. As previously mentioned, the notion of intentional wrongdoing 
(faute intentionnelle) means that not only was the damaging behaviour deliberate (faute 
volontaire) but the wrongdoer also intended the subsequent damaging harm.51
Article 1371 Catala Draft  clearly settles this issue by stating that ‘[p]unitive damages 
may not be the subject of a contract of insurance’. In contrast, Article 69 Terré Tort Draft  
is silent on that matter. However, since it requires an intentional wrongdoing for the 
allocation of exemplary damages, the non-insurability against such punitive award 
derives from Article L. 113–1 Insurance Code and does not need to be expressly provided 
for in the reform draft .
Article 1386–25 Béteille Proposal is also silent on that aspect, although the Béteille & 
Anziani report pays attention to it.52 Consequently, one could be insured against punitive 
award sanctioning his or her deliberate damaging behaviour as long as any intentional 
wrongdoing cannot be proved.
4. Conclusion
Presently, the introduction into French civil law of punitive or exemplary damages is 
envisaged by three competing reform draft s of the Code civil. Th e punitive damages 
provision of the Béteille Proposal could be depicted as an improved version of the 
corresponding provision of the Catala Draft . In short, the Béteille Proposal operates a 
compromise between the call from university scholars for punitive damages and the fear 
from legal practitioners and the business sector for excessive and arbitrary damages 
awards. Its punitive damages provision is indeed sector-based and designed to avoid 
excesses through the limitation of the punitive award and mandatory disclosure of the 
judge’s reasoning, while the award’s benefi ciaries range from the victim, an 
indemnifi cation fund to the public treasury.
51 See above, footnote 33.
52 Th e reporters are not opposed to the insurability against punitive damages condemnation, while the 
consultees are divided on that issue. Arguments against insurability put forward by consultees are 
many. It fi rst would be contrary to public morals according to Article 6 Civil Code which stipulates that 
‘Statutes relating to public policy and morals may not be derogated from by private agreements’. 
Another argument is that as one cannot insure itself against criminal sanctions, one should neither be 
allowed to insure itself against punitive damages. Th e mechanism of punitive damages would lose its 
deterrent impact if the wrongdoer does not personally take on the sanction told Jourdain to the Law 
Commission. Conversely the Ministry of Justice considers that the insurance premium against such 
sanction would be so high that it will itself deter the committing lucrative fault. Furthermore preventing 
insurability against punitive damages would leave a heavy fi nancial burden on companies and might 
on the long term lead to relocation of economic activities, Anziani & Béteille 2009, p. 97–98, see also 
Pierre 2010, § II.A.1.
P
R
O
EF
 1
Punitive Damages in the Competing Reform Draft s of the French Civil Code
276
In contrast, the Terré Tort Draft  follows a quite diff erent approach. Th ere, exemplary 
damages would apply against intentional infringements of one’s personal integrity as 
restitutionary damages are considered a more appropriate tool against lucrative faults. 
Assessment of an exemplary award is left  to the discretion of the judge who is nevertheless 
required to render an especially reasoned decision, while the award only benefi ts to the 
victim.
Opponents to punitive damages invoke their incompatibility with the fundamental 
principle of full reparation and the disruption their introduction would cause to the 
frontier between civil and criminal law. Th ose in favour of – restrictive – punitive 
damages’ codifi cation consider that it would fi ll in a gap which has led, in the judicial 
practice, to covert punitive damages award. A declared civil liability policy towards 
certain serious damaging conducts would enhanced legal security, indeed a punitive 
damages device would have a dissuasive impact on potential wrongdoers and an incentive 
eff ect on victim to claim damages.
Whether a punitive damages provision will end up in the civil code is diffi  cult to say. 
Th e phenomenon of lucrative faults, revealing the limits of the full reparation principle, 
has inspired the incorporation of a punitive damages provision in the two fi rst reform 
draft s. Discussions prior and following publications of the fi rst draft s focused indeed on 
lucrative faults. Since the Terré Tort Draft  opts for restitutionary damages against 
lucrative faults, a tool which, in contrast with punitive damages, is compatible with basic 
reparation principles, the attractiveness of punitive damages might water down.
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